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1. Introduction
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) stresses the importance of benchmarking firm perfor-
mance to that of a group of peer firms. Beginning with Antle and Smith (1986), a vast number of
empirical RPE studies have focused on the role of peer firms operating within the same competi-
tive arena, which subjects them to common economic shocks. Comparing a firm’s performance to
that of its competitive peer provides a more precise signal of the manager’s actions by filtering out
the exogenous common shock, which is outside of his or her influence. While outperforming the
competition generally increases firm value, it does not capture all value-increasing actions under
the manager’s control.
Beyond executing current strategies, firms also increase value by pursing new strategies that
lead to opportunities not offered within the current competitive arena. Benchmarking firm perfor-
mance against a competitive peer group will not sufficiently capture these type of actions. We posit
that firms instead benchmark firm performance relative to an “aspirational” group of peer firms–
those with value-maximizing strategies that a manager takes actions to emulate. This provides an
incentive for managers to take actions that inevitably increase the correlation between the firm’s
performance and the performance of its aspirational peer in an effort to mimic their strategy. As
a result, performance correlation captures the relative performance component of the manager’s
actions.
In this study, we examine the manner and extent to which the correlation between the per-
formances of a firm and its aspirational peer (hereafter, performance correlation) affects CEO
compensation. This extends previous RPE investigations that focus on the role of competitive peer
firms in filtering out exogenous shocks by using aggregate peer performance in the evaluation of
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CEO performance.1 Our focus on the role of performance correlation with respect to aspirational
peer firms complements these studies by identifying a new dimension of RPE that contributes to a
more robust understanding of how firms evaluate and compensate executives.
Our empirical analysis is guided by a simplified version of an agency model recently proposed
in Hemmer (2016). The model extends the fundamental one-firm, one-agent dynamic model of
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) by including two firms: a focal firm and an aspirational peer firm.
The aspirational firm is characterized by a more efficient production technology that the focal firm
seeks to emulate. Both firms have a manager able to control the performance of his or her own firm
in real time. As a result, the actions of the focal firm’s manager implicitly influences the covariance
between the performances of the two firms.
This general endogeneity of the performance covariance when RPE is optimal provides empiri-
cal predictions related to aspirational peers in stark contrast to those of prior RPE studies that focus
on competitive peers. In particular, while the standard aggregation result for own performance re-
mains valid (Holmstro¨m 1982; Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1987), aggregate peer performance is no
longer sufficient to capture the relative component, which requires information about the entire
path of performances over the contracting horizon. Instead, if the performance of both firms is
observed more frequently than the contract horizon, then the realized correlation between own and
aspirational peer firm performance histories becomes a sufficient statistic for the information about
relative performance contained in these paths. In equilibrium, the focal firm’s manager is optimally
provided incentives to increase the performance correlation in an effort to emulate the strategy of
the peer firm. As a result, the optimal compensation given to the focal firm’s manager becomes
1Key empirical papers on the relation between CEO compensation and aggregate performance of a competitive
peer group are Antle and Smith (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b), Garvey and Milbourn (2003), and Albuquerque (2009), among others.
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a linear function of aggregate own firm performance and the realized performance correlation,
which is the primary factor that captures the relative evaluation component.
Testing this empirical prediction is predicated on our ability to identify peer firms that are con-
sidered aspirational in nature. While aspirational peers are readily defined by the parameters of
our model, identifying them empirically is not so straightforward because the relevant parame-
ter(s) are out-of-equilibrium constructs, as is often the case in principal-agent theory. Therefore,
we begin our analysis with data provided by Equilar, an executive compensation consulting firm,
which identifies a portfolio of peer firms for each focal firm. However, the type of peer firm (e.g.,
aspirational, competitive) is not provided. Therefore, our tests may lack sufficient power to detect
an association between CEO compensation and peer performance correlation to the extent that
identified set of firms represent a mixture of aspirational and competitive peers.
Our proxy for performance correlation is the correlation between three-day stock returns of
the focal firm and its peer group measured within the fiscal year. We exclusively focus on stock
returns, rather than an accounting-based metric (e.g., return on assets), because they provide fre-
quent, real-time performance feedback. This feature permits the CEO’s compensation to depend
on performance correlation and is consistent with a key feature of our model. In addition, re-
turns are the most prevalent performance measure used in prior RPE studies, which increases the
comparability of our results with those in the existing literature.
Using 7,039 firm-year observations between 2007 and 2014 with identified peers, we test
whether performance correlation affects annual CEO compensation. Our results are surprisingly
sharp in that we find a strong and statistically significant positive association after controlling for
a number of other compensation determinants, including aggregate own firm returns as well as
aggregate peer returns. This is consistent with our central prediction that firms do evaluate CEOs
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relative to an aspirational peer group.
In light of our primary empirical finding, we further explore the role of aggregate peer per-
formance, which has been the primary focus of prior RPE studies. We extend the structure of
the model to allow for an asymmetry in the covariance sensitivity to positive and negative per-
formances. In equilibrium, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in aggregate peer
performance is predicted to be increasing in the sign and magnitude of the asymmetry. We find
empirical evidence consistent with this prediction, which has no counterpart in standard RPE mod-
els with competitive peers. This provides further evidence that, to some extent, firms benchmark
performance relative to an aspirational group of peer firms.
We conclude our empirical analysis with a preliminary exploration of several characteristics
of the relation between the firm and its peer in order to better identify aspirational peers and dis-
tinguish them from competitive peers. Our identification strategy utilizes a key result from our
model: the positive association between compensation and performance correlation is increasing
in the degree to which the peer firm is considered aspirational. Based on this guidance, we test
whether the predicted implications of having a more or less aspirational peer are consistent with
independently obtained characteristics that might reasonably be associated with aspirational peers.
We focus on the effect of three observable characteristics on the sensitivity of CEO compen-
sation to performance correlation: (1) the peer firm does not list the focal firm as its peer (i.e., a
one-way relationship), (2) the peer firm is larger in size than the focal firm, and (3) the peer firm
is a different industry than the focal firm. The presence of these type of relationships between the
firm and its peer is reasonably diagnostic of an aspirational peer, but not a competitive peer. For
example, if a firm uses a competitive peer to filter exogenous common shocks, then the peer firm
is expected to reciprocate and list the firm as its peer, which results in a relationship that is not
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one-way.
In our sample, each firm-year observation contains multiple peer firms with available data,
which often have observable differences in the three relationship characteristics we examine. We
utilize a novel research design that exploits important variation in these characteristics within each
firm-year observation in order to measure and test the effect on sensitivity of CEO compensation
to performance correlation. We find that this sensitivity becomes more positive, at statistically
significant levels, when the relationship with the peer firm is one-way and when the peer firm is
not in the same industry as the focal firm. The size of the peer firm relative to the focal firm does
not significantly affect the association.
Our results indicate that a non-mutual firm-peer relationship and a peer that is in a different
line of business are diagnostic of an aspirational peer relation with the focal firm. While obviously
not conclusive, this result is informative in its own right and, again, cannot be explained by the
standard RPE theory in which the optimal peer group formation is driven by exogenous covariance
considerations.
Overall, the results of this study provide evidence consistent with firms benchmarking perfor-
mance relative a set of aspirational peers that is distinct from the performance evaluation relative
to a set of competitive peers. In addition, firms do not appear to exclusively select peer groups
based on the exogenous covariance between them as per the standard RPE prediction. Instead, our
results indicate that peers also choose peers based on aspirational properties.2 This highlights the
importance of distinguishing aspirational and competitive peers in order to better understand how
firms evaluate their executives.
2Ma et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence inconsistent with firms optimally selecting peers solely on the exoge-
nous covariance, which is predicted by standard RPE theory. They suggest that firms’ seemingly suboptimal choices
result from boards not “getting it right.” However, the results of our study suggest that boards may still “get it right,”
while the standard RPE model with competitive peers is not sufficient to capture the multi-dimensional nature of RPE.
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More broadly, the importance of this distinction is underscored by numerous examples from
other endeavors. Sociology studies find that aspirational peers and associative peers (similar to
competitive peers) have different influences on consumer behaviors (e.g., Merton and Rossi 1968;
Bearden and Etzel 1982). The world’s largest business education alliance, the Association to
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), distinguishes peer schools that are aspirational
from those that are competitive/comparable as part of their accreditation process. A professional
basketball scout seeking to identify the next Michael Jordan, will certainly look favorably upon
a prospective player whose team outperformed the competition in a recent college tournament.
However, playing each game in a manner similar to Michael Jordan, such as the ability to make
game-winning shots, also provides a positive signal about his future potential in the professional
league. In fact, we see everyday reminders of the value of such emulative behavior in Gatorade
advertisements that remind us how great it would feel to play basketball like Michael Jordan.3
Many people compete with their neighbors to keep up with the Joneses, but also aspire to keep up
with the Kardashians.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main features of
the agency model that guides our empirical analyses. Section 3 describes our empirical methods
and sample. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 identifies and tests characteristics of
aspirational peer firms. Section 6 concludes.
3The phrase “Be Like Mike” in the title of our study refers to a Gatorade commercial that originally aired in 1992
and was re-aired in 2015. In the commercial, footage of Michael Jordan playing basketball, juxtaposed with video of
young kids imitating his moves, was used as a backdrop to the lyrics of a song: “Sometimes I dream that he is me. /
You’ve got to see that’s how I dream to be. / I dream I move, I dream I groove. / Like Mike. If I could be like Mike.”
The commercial embodies the spirit of our study and the results that we document.
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2. Theoretical Foundation
In this section we summarize the main features of a simplified version of the agency model
developed in Hemmer (2016). Two key features of the model guide our empirical predictions.
First, it extends the fundamental one-firm, one-agent dynamic model of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987) by including two firms, a focal firm and its aspirational peer, that each have a manager
able to control the performance of his or her own firm. Second, it incorporates the approach of
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) where the performance feedback is received frequently over time
as opposed to only once at the end as in a standard one-shot agency model.
The analysis of this multi-agent problem uses the standard Nash-approach of Holmstro¨m (1982)
but otherwise follows directly that of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, Sections 2 and 3). Because
multiple agents invalidates Theorem 3 (uniqueness) in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), the opti-
mal RPE contract must be found through standard optimization. This is important because it re-
introduces the likelihood ratios of Holmstro¨m (1982), which are absent in the single-agent setting
of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), as the key determinant of the properties of the optimal RPE
contract. This makes clear that extrapolating from a single-agent, multiple-performance-measures
setting to provide predictions for the multi-agent RPE case we rely on is not as straightforward
as it may seem. Still, the key stationarity results of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987, Theorems 4
and 5) prevail, and the optimal RPE contract can also be obtained in the limit by solving for the
optimal RPE contract in any one sub-period and letting the number of sub-periods grow large as in
the single-agent case.
To provide some more specific details, consider a simple agency model populated by an agent
of a focal firm and an agent of a peer firm. Assume that both firms have a fixed-length contract
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horizon that is subdivided into m identical subperiods, indexed by τ ∈{1, ...,m}. After observing
past own and peer performances in a given subperiod τ , the agent of the focal firm exerts (costly)
effort to choose the probability pτ that its firm’s performance, drawn from a binomial distribution
ω˜τ ∈ {ω−, ω+}, will be high, ω+ > ω−. The performance of the peer firm, also drawn from a
binomial distribution p˜iτ ∈{pi−, pi+}, is high pi+>pi− with a probability of qτ , which is fixed and
exogenous to the model.4 Finally, let γ+τ (γ
−
τ ) be the conditional probability that peer performance
is high (low), pi+ (pi−), whenever the performance of the focal firm is high (low), ω+ (ω−).
In order to simplify our analysis, let γ+τ =a·γτ and γ−τ =γτ , such that the parameter a captures
asymmetries in the structure of the performance covariance. The case of a= 1 corresponds to the
symmetric case where high and low outcomes for the peer are equally probable conditional on own
performance, while a>1 (a<1) corresponds to the case where high (low) peer outcomes are more
probable given high (low) outcomes for the focal firm. The advantage of introducing asymmetric
sensitivity in this way is that the predictions become particularly crisp while at the same time being
perfectly general for this model. Consistent with prior RPE studies, we maintain a focus on the
case where the two firms’ performances are positively correlated in equilibrium, such that γτ > 12 .
This implies that the agent’s explicit control over the focal firm’s performance also grants it implicit
control over the performance covariances γ+τ and γ
−
τ , such that γ
+
p = dγ
+
τ /dpτ and γ
−
p = dγ
−
τ /dpτ
are not equal to zero. Figure 1 provides a diagram of the sub-period structure for the conditional
probabilities of this model.
Because qτ is outside of the control of the focal agent in this model, it is determined as part
of a Nash Equilibrium and can therefore be treated as “fixed and known” in the analysis of the
4This binomial structure is the direct counterpart to the two-dimensional Brownian example in Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1987) in which each dimension is specifically meant to be the continuous-time approximation of a single
binomial random walk.
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focal agent, as per Holmstro¨m (1982). As a result, the covariance between the performances of
the two firms must implicitly depend on the actions of the focal agent pτ unless the performances
are uncorrelated (i.e., γτ = 12 ).
5 Therefore, the focal agents’ explicit control over the performance
of its firm nearly always grants them implicit control over the covariance between own and peer
firm performances, such that γp = dγτ/dpτ 6= a. Finally, with qτ > pτ and γτ > 12 , the peer
firm is considered to be an aspirational peer because the focal firm aspires to emulate its higher
probability qτ of high performance by influencing the covariance between them. When these two
conditions are met, γp uniquely identifies the peer firm as having an aspirational characteristic.
Theorem 2 of Hemmer (2016) demonstrates that when performance feedback becomes very
frequent (i.e., as m→∞), the optimal compensation given to the focal firm’s agent, S˜(~ω, ~pi), is a
more complex function of the history of own firm performance, ~ω = [ω1, ..., ωm ], and the history
of peer firm performance, ~pi = [pi1, ..., pim ], realized across all m sub-periods within the contract
horizon, than what the standard agency theory suggests. Specifically, based on the structure of
this basic model, S˜(~ω, ~pi) can be expressed as the following linear function of own and peer firm
performance measures:
S˜(~ω, ~pi) = β0 + βΩ · Ω˜ + βρ · ρ˜ + βΠ · Π˜, (1)
where Ω˜ and Π˜ are the aggregate performances of the focal firm and peer firm, respectively, over
the contract horizon; Π˜ is the correlation between the historical subperiod performances of the
5Based on the model structure (illustrated in Figure 1), the following must hold in every subperiod τ : qτ =
pτγτ + (1 − pτ )(1 − γτ ). Differentiating this identity with respect to the focal agent’s effort pτ yields dqτ/dpτ =
(2γτ − 1) + (2pτ − 1)(dγτ/dpτ ). Setting dqτ/dpτ = 0 (i.e., qτ is fixed and exogenous) and rearranging terms yields
dγτ/dpτ = (2γτ − 1)/(1 − 2pτ ), which is not equal to zero unless γτ = 12 . Therefore, the performance covariation
parameter γτ must be an implicit function of the focal agent’s action.
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focal firm ~ω and the peer firm ~pi; and βΩ, βρ, and βΠ are measures of the sensitivity of the focal
agent’s pay to observable performance measures Ω˜, ρ˜, and Π˜, respectively.
The sensitivity of compensation to the three performance measures is proportional to different
linear combinations of the likelihood ratios for the four possible sub-period performance outcome
combinations: {ω+,pi+}, {ω−,pi−}, {ω+,pi−}, {ω−,pi+}. Because the likelihood ratios are straight-
forward to calculate here, it is also straightforward to show that when peers are chosen as aspira-
tional, the optimal level of compensation is always an increasing function of own firm performance
(i.e., βΩ > 0). This preserves the single-agent result from Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) in our
multi-agent context.
In contrast, the manner by which the relative peer performance measures, Π˜ and ρ˜, affect
optimal compensation represents an abrupt departure from standard predictions, but provides a
theoretical foundation that motivates our empirical analysis. Specifically, peer performance affects
the optimal compensation given to the focal agent by placing a positive weight on the correlation ρ˜
between the historical sub-period performances of the focal firm and the peer firm. In this basic
model structure, ρ˜ is proportional to γp/γτ (1−γτ ) (Hemmer 2016, Theorem 4). As a result, ρ˜ will
be positive when γp > 0, which is exactly the condition that identifies the peer firm as aspirational
from the perspective of the focal firm.
An agent that successfully emulates its aspirational peer firm causes its own firm’s performance
to be more positively correlated with the aspirational peer firm’s performance, which leads to
higher performance, on average. It follows that optimal compensation will naturally depend, in
part, on this correlation measure in order to incentivize the agent to engage in such emulative
actions leading to higher performance. In other words, if the actions of the focal firm’s agent
affect its own firm’s aggregate performance and that affects the correlation between own firm
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and aspirational peer performances, such that γp > 0, then the compensation will be a function
of both measures because they both provide informative signals about the agent’s actions. The
performance correlation over the entire horizon may, in fact, act as a sufficient statistic for all of the
information contained in their relative performance histories that is missing from own firm and peer
firm aggregate performance measures. This result leads to the following empirical implication:
Empirical Implication 1. In a setting where performance feedback is frequent rel-
ative to the contract horizon, compensation is positively associated with the realized
correlation, measured over the contract horizon, between own firm and aspirational
peer firm performances (i.e., βρ > 0).
Finally, the weight on aggregate peer performance βΠ in (1) is directly proportional to the sen-
sitivity of compensation to performance correlation βρ and the exogenous asymmetry parameter a
that drives a wedge between γ+τ and γ
−
τ (Hemmer 2016, Theorm 4). This provides two key im-
plications. First, βΠ directly proportional to βρ means that βΠ 6= 0, if, and only if, βρ 6= 0. This
implies that if the manager has no influence over the covariance between own and peer perfor-
mance, such that γp = 0, then no form of relative performance evaluation survives in the optimal
contract. In other words, a necessary condition for optimal compensation to depend on aggregate
peer performance requires that Empirical Implication 1 be true (i.e., βρ > 0).
Second, if βρ is greater than zero, then βΠ is directly proportional to the asymmetry parame-
ter a. In cases where a > 1, the peer firm has a larger probability of high performance conditional
on high focal firm performance than its probability of low peer performance conditional upon low
focal firm performance and vice-versa when a < 1. As a result, the unconditional performance
correlation ρ˜ in (1) no longer acts as a sufficient statistic for all of the information contained in
the relative performance histories because they are asymmetrically influenced by differences in the
conditional probability structure. Therefore, the weight placed on aggregate peer performance βΠ
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in (1) is strictly increasing in a. (Hemmer 2016, Theorm 2). This helps filter the asymmetric effect
on the two conditional probabilities, which cannot be accomplished by relying on the unconditional
correlation ρ˜ alone. This leads to the second empirical implication:
Empirical Implication 2. If performance feedback is frequent relative to the con-
tract horizon and βρ > 0, then the sensitivity of compensation to realized aggregate
performance of an aspirational peer is strictly increasing in the asymmetry a between
positive and negative conditional probabilities (i.e., dβΠ/da > 0).
3. Research Design and Sample
Section 3.1 describes the research design that we use to test our empirical predictions based on
the model developed in the previous section. Section 3.2 describes our sample selection procedure
and presents descriptive statistics for the final sample.
3.1. Research Design
Our model of aspirational peers as well as traditional RPE models with competitive peers (e.g.,
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1987) both derive an optimal compensation contract that is linear in own
firm and peer performance measures (see equation 1). Linearity naturally conforms to a regression
model, which we use to measure and test the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance cor-
relation with aspirational peers. Specifically, our primary test is based on the following empirical
analog to (1):
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ · Retj,t + βρ · Perf Corrj,t + βΠ · Peer Retj,t + Controlsj,t + εj,t, (2)
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where j denotes a unique focal firm and t indicates a unique fiscal year. The dependent vari-
able Compj,t is the change between fiscal year t and t–1 in the annual compensation given to firm j’s
CEO. Annual compensation is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, total
value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts
and all other compensation (ExecuComp TDCI).
The proxies for the three performance measures we examine are based on measures of stock
returns, rather than accounting-based fundamental performance measures, such as return on assets.
Our choice is guided by the fact that returns provide performance feedback that is observed with
a significantly higher frequency than the fiscal year for which the CEO is compensated. This
real-time performance feedback allows management to take actions continuously to adjust the
firm’s strategies in an effort to emulate its aspirational peers. This feature permits the CEO’s
compensation to depend on performance correlation and is consistent with a key feature of our
model. In contrast, accounting-based performance measures are observable only on a quarterly
basis, at best, which does not provide real-time performance feedback and prevents a reasonable
measurement of performance correlation within the fiscal year.
Prior RPE studies have typically examined both return-based and accounting-based measures
because traditional RPE models are silent on the exact nature of the performance metric. In addi-
tion, these models predict that performances aggregated across the contract horizon (e.g., annual
return, annual ROA) is sufficient for evaluating management. As a result, temporally aggregated
stock returns and observed aggregate accounting-based performance are both naturally amenable
to empirical tests of RPE theory with competitive peers.
The first performance measure Retj,t in (2) captures firm j’s aggregate own performance and
is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus j’s annual buy-and-hold return in fiscal year t.
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The corresponding coefficient βΩ in (2) measures the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity and
is expected to be positive based on the predictions of our model and traditional RPE models. Thus,
finding a positive coefficient on βΩ is more of a necessary condition than something that helps us
empirically discriminate between the influence of aspirational and competitive peer firms.
The second performance measure Perf Corrj,t is the performance correlation between short-
window stock returns of firm j and stock returns of j’s peer firm k during fiscal year t, averaged
over all of j’s peer firms. For each unique firm-year-peer observation, we partition the fiscal year t
into eighty-four equal subperiods representing three consecutive days with valid return observa-
tions. For each subperiod within t, denoted by the subscript τ ∈ {1, ..., 84} we compute the natural
logarithm of one plus firm j’s three-day buy-and-hold return, ret 3-dayj,t,τ . We also compute the subpe-
riod performance for each j’s peer firms k, peer ret 3-dayj,t,k,τ , equal to the natural logarithm of one plus
the three-day buy-and-hold portfolio return. We measure perf corrj,t,k as the correlation coefficient
between ret 3-dayj,t,τ and peer ret
3-day
j,t,k,τ based on the eighty-four time-series observations within the fis-
cal year. Perf Corrj,t is computed as the equal-weighted average of perf corrj,t,k among all Nj,t
of j’s peers during fiscal year t.
It is important to note that our measurement of Perf Corrj,t, based on the correlation coefficient
between three-day returns, is intended to approximate the degree to which management enacts
strategies that mimic its aspirational peer firms. We do not expect that this performance correlation
using three-day returns will explicitly enter CEO compensation contracts. Rather, it serves as a
proxy for informative signals about management’s success in pursuing these strategies that results
in an implicit relation with compensation, which is the primary focus of our study.6 In addition,
6An examination of the specific forms of performance correlation implicitly used in RPE is outside the scope of
this study. We leave this for future research.
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we do not distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic return correlations because managers
may pursue either, or both, if they are part of the aspirational peer firm’s strategy.7
Our primary coefficient of interest is βρ in (2), which measures the CEO’s pay-for-performance
correlation sensitivity. Based on our empirical prediction developed in the previous section (see
Empirical Implication 1), βρ is expected to be positive and statistically significant. However, this
prediction is conditional upon the nature of the peer firms identified. If they are not considered
aspirational peers, then our empirical tests will lack the necessary power to detect a positive coeffi-
cient. In addition, most peer groups likely contain a mixture of some aspirational peers with βρ > 0
along with others that are considered non-aspirational (e.g., competitive peers) for which βρ = 0.
In this case, the presence of other peer groups potentially dilutes the ability to detect an association
at the peer portfolio level. Therefore, our tests of βρ > 0 are ultimately a joint test of our empir-
ical prediction as well as having identified peer groups that contain a non-trivial fraction that are
aspirational.
Identifying an appropriate aspirational peer group presents a significant obstacle in our em-
pirical tests. An unfortunate feature of the model guiding our analysis is that the identification
of aspirational peers is based on an out-of-equilibrium property, the marginal change in the firm-
peer covariance, which is captured by the model parameter γp. This property is neither observable
nor directly measurable. Therefore, we rely on data provided by Equilar, an executive compensa-
7For example, consider the manager of a passive market index fund that is focused on tracking the underlying
market index. He or she is provided incentives to take actions (e.g., periodically re-balancing the portfolio to accom-
modate changes in the index) that increase the correlation of the fund’s performance with that of the market index,
which primarily represents the systematic component. In contrast, a hedge fund manager may focus on emulating an
aspirational peer fund manager in an effort to increase abnormal, risk-adjusted return performance, which primarily
represents an idiosyncratic component. Thus, the informativeness of distinguishing between these two return com-
ponents crucially hinges on the ability to identify the specific nature of the strategies of the aspirational peer that the
firms is attempting to emulate. While interesting, it is outside the scope of our study, so again we leave it for future
research.
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tion consulting firm, to identify our aspirational peer group. Equilar derives its data from firms’
self-reported peer groups provided as part of the SEC-mandated Compensation, Discussion and
Analysis proxy disclosure. Our empirical tests are based on this form of peer identification as our
proxy for aspirational peer firms despite the fact that other peer groups are also included.
The final performance measure Peer Retj,t included in our empirical model captures the average
aggregate performance of firm j’s peer firms during fiscal year t. For each unique firm-year-peer
observation, we compute the aggregate performance of firm j’s peer firm k during fiscal year t,
peer retj,t,k, as the natural logarithm of one plus the annual buy-and-hold return. Peer Retj,t is
computed as the equal-weighted average of peer retj,t,k among all Nj,t of firm j’s peer firms during
fiscal year t.
Finally, we include additional explanatory variables, denoted by Controlsj,t in (2), as part of the
empirical model to control for other determinants of CEO compensation. Following prior studies,
we include firm size (Rosen 1982; Smith and Watts 1992), growth opportunities (Smith and Watts
1992; Core and Guay 1999), idiosyncratic return volatility (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999b; Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker 1999), the number of peer firms (Dikolli, Hofmann, and Pfeiffer 2013),
percentage of peer relationships that are one-way (i.e., peer firm does not consider focal firm as
its peer), percentage of peer firms that are larger than the focal firm, percentage of peer firms in a
different two-digit SIC industry than the focal firm, CEO tenure (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001),
CEO ownership (Core et al. 1999), an indicator variable for a CEO that is also the board chair
(Core et al. 1999), and industry and year fixed-effect parameters (Albuquerque 2009; Jayaraman,
Milbourn, and Seo 2015). The appendix contains a complete description of each variable as well
as how they are measured.
Our second test examines the role of aggregate peer performance, which has been the primary
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focus of prior RPE studies with competitive peers, in shaping CEO compensation with respect to
aspirational peer firms. Guided by the second empirical implication of our model, the coefficient
on aggregate peer performance βΠ in (2) is expected to be an increasing function of the difference
between the conditional covariance between positive and negative performances if aspirational
peer firms influence RPE. This asymmetry is represented by the parameter a in our model.
We construct an empirical proxy for this parameter with an indicator variable A+j,t that is equal
to one if firm j has a positive asymmetry (a > 1) during fiscal year t and equal to zero otherwise
(a ≤ 1). We define a given firm-year observation as having a positive asymmetry (A+j,t = 1) if the
average probability of a positive return for j’s peer firms, conditional on j also having a positive
return, is greater than the average probability of a non-positive peer return, conditional on j also
having a non-positive return. Both conditional probabilities are estimated using historical returns
from the three prior fiscal years. A detailed description of the measurement of A+j,t appears in the
appendix.
We extended the regression model in (2) by allowing the coefficient on aggregate peer perfor-
mance βΠ to change as a function of the covariance asymmetry proxy A+j,t as follows:
Compj,t = β0 + β
+
0 · A+j,t + βΩ ·Retj,t + βρ ·Perf Corrj,t
+ βΠ ·Peer Retj,t + βA+Π · (Peer Retj,t ·A+j,t) + Controlsj,t + εj,t. (3)
The coefficient βA+Π measures the incremental change in the CEO’s pay-for-aggregate peer perfor-
mance sensitivity as the covariance asymmetry increases from non-positive (A+j,t = 0) to positive
(A+j,t = 1). Based on the empirical prediction developed in the previous section (see Empirical Im-
plication 1), we expect a positive and statistically significant value for βA+Π if aspirational peer firms
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influence relative performance evaluation. Traditional RPE models with competitive peers do not
provide a similar prediction, which further facilitates our identification of the role of aspirational
peers as distinct from the role of competitive peers.
Finally, the coefficient βΠ measures the magnitude of the CEO’s pay-for-aggregate peer per-
formance sensitivity when the covariance asymmetry is negative (A+j,t = 0). It is expected to have a
negative value regardless of whether the peer is competitive (traditional RPE predictions) or aspi-
rational (our RPE model). Because βΠ does not discriminate between the separate effects of both
peer groups, we focus our analyses on tests of βA+Π rather than βΠ.
3.2. Sample Description
We begin with an initial sample of 15,170 (260,220) firm-year (firm-year-peer) observations
provided by Equilar that are manually matched to both Compustat gvkey and CRSP permno. We
require non-missing data for CEO compensation as well as all variables for the focal firm. In
addition, firm-year observations are excluded if the firm had more than one CEO during the fiscal
year.
Next, we require each unique firm-year-peer combination to have non-missing peer perfor-
mance return data to compute all relevant variables as described in the appendix. Finally, all
continuous variables are winsorized at one and ninety-nine percent to reduce the influence of out-
liers. Our final sample contains 7,039 (121,256) firm-year (firm-year-peer) observations with fiscal
years ending between 2007 and 2014.
Descriptive statistics for all variables in the final sample are presented in Table 1. Firm-year
observations have a mean (median) of 17.2 (16) peer firms. In addition, the mean value of A+j,t
is 0.646, which indicates that firm-year observations have a positive conditional probability that is,
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on average, less than its negative conditional probability.
Table 2 presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlation
coefficients for all continuous regression variables. Not surprisingly, the correlation between CEO
compensation and own firm returns is positive (0.172) and statistically significant. In addition, the
performance correlation variable has a positive (0.063) and statistically significant correlation with
CEO compensation, which provides preliminary univariate support for our predictions with respect
to aspirational peer firms.
4. Results
Table 3 presents results related to our primary test of a positive association between CEO com-
pensation and performance correlation (see Empirical Implication 1 in Section 2). In the first
two columns, coefficient estimates are based on the regression in (2) without any control vari-
ables included, which conforms with the relation derived in equation (1). The first specification
(column one) includes the aggregate own firm performance Retj,t and aggregate peer firm perfor-
mance Peer Retj,t, but excludes the performance correlation variable Perf Corrj,t. This specifica-
tion mirrors traditional RPE specifications examining the role of competitive peers in which the
coefficient on own firm performance βΩ is expected to be positive, while the coefficient on aggre-
gate peer performance βΠ is expected to be negative to account for exogenous common shocks.
The estimated value of the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity βΩ is positive and equal to
0.239 (t-statistic of 10.14), which is different from zero based on a 1% level of statistical signifi-
cance.8 While this result does not discriminate between the roles of competitive and aspirational
peer firms, it is nevertheless consistent with the presence of both and is comparable to results
8All test statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm.
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reported in prior RPE studies.
In addition, the estimated coefficient on the aggregate equal-weighted peer performance mea-
sure Peer Retj,t is −0.061 (t-statistic of −2.08), which is different from zero based on a 5% level
of statistical significance.9 This result is consistent with traditional RPE predictions, which predict
that firms deduct the common component in the competitive peer’s performance when determining
the CEO compensation.
In column two, we add the performance correlation variable Perf Corrj,t to the previous spec-
ification to test for an incremental role of aspirational peer firms in performance evaluation. The
coefficient βρ on the performance correlation measure is equal to 0.324 (t-statistic of 7.82), which
is different from zero based on a 1% level of statistical significance. This result is consistent with
our predictions that CEOs are compensated in part for their ability to become more correlated with
their aspirational peer firms.
In addition, the inclusion of Perf Corrj,t in the regression reduces the coefficient on aggregate
peer performance βΠ in both magnitude and statistical significance. Specifically, βΠ is −0.018
(t-statistic of −0.59). This represents a 70.5% decrease in the magnitude relative to column one
and is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 provide results for the fully specified regression, which
includes all control variables and fixed-effect parameters. Overall, these results provide confirma-
tion of the conclusions drawn from the abbreviated specifications in the first two columns. The
estimated coefficients on aggregate own firm performance βΩ and performance correlation βρ are
equal to 0.217 (t-statistic of 9.47) and 0.485 (t-statistic of 8.65), respectively, and both are different
9Similar results are obtained for all specifications using value-weighted peer performance measures instead of
equal-weighted measures. Specifically, Tables 3 and 4 are replicated using value-weighted performance measures.
Results are reported in tables OA.1 and OA.1, respectively, of the online appendix.
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from zero based on a 1% level of statistical significance.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 provide supporting evidence that aspirational peers are
used to evaluate CEO performance as we predicted. In addition, the positive coefficient on perfor-
mance correlation βρ fulfills the necessary condition (see Empirical Implication 2 in Section 2) for
our next set of tests examining the conditional role of aggregate peer performance.
Table 4 reports coefficient values estimated from the regression in (3), which allows the coef-
ficient on aggregate peer performance to vary with the asymmetry in the conditional probability
structure. The estimated values of βΩ and βρ in column one are 0.213 (t-statistic of 9.16) and
0.523 (t-statistic of 9.16), respectively. Both coefficients are different from zero with a 1% level of
statistical significance.
The coefficient βA+Π on the interaction between aggregate peer performance measure and the
asymmetric covariance indicator variable is 0.281 (t-statistic of 3.28), which is different from zero
based on a 1% level of statistical significance. More importantly, the negative coefficient is consis-
tent with our prediction with respect to the influence of aspirational peers. As the asymmetry in-
creases, the CEO pay-for-peer aggregate performance sensitivity also increases because aggregate
peer performance supplements the relative evaluation component with additional information about
the conditional covariance structure that is not reflected by the unconditional performance corre-
lation measure alone. The coefficient on the aggregate peer performance measure βΠ is −0.201
(t-statistic of −2.40), which is different from zero based on a 5% level of statistical significance.
The negative value is consistent with RPE predictions with respect to aspirational and competitive
peer models.
We test the robustness of the interaction analysis by partitioning our sample into two groups
based on whether the observation has a positive or non-positive covariance asymmetry. The sec-
21
ond and third columns reports coefficient values for both sub-samples that are estimated from the
specification in (2). The fourth column tests for differences in the coefficients between the two
sub-samples. Results from this analysis confirm the previous interaction coefficients reported in
column one. Overall, the results presented in Table 4 provide additional evidence that firms evalu-
ate and compensate CEOs in part on their ability to increase the performance correlation with their
aspirational peer firms.
5. Characteristics of Aspirational Peers
The results of our main tests indicate that, on average, firms benchmark performance in part
based on a set of aspirational peers. While this provides encouraging support for our hypothesis, it
provides no guidance on the identification of aspirational peers within the set of all peer firms. We
conclude our analyses by testing whether several observable dimensions of the relation between a
firm and its peer are indicative of an aspirational relationship.
Aspirational peer firms are easy to identify in our model by the parameter γp, which increases in
the degree to which the peer firm is considered aspirational. Unfortunately, measuring this param-
eter is not feasible because it relates to an out-of-equilibrium construct. Therefore, we identify γp
indirectly by utilizing a key outcome of the model in which the pay-for-performance correlation
sensitivity, captured by βρ in (1) and (2), is an increasing function of γp. Large (small) positive
values of βρ indicate a strong (weak) aspirational relationship between the firm and its peer.
In our sample, firm-year observations have a mean (median) of 17.2 (16) peer firms (see Ta-
ble 1). Characteristics of the relation between the firm and each individual peer varies along several
observable dimensions, such as the relative sizes of the two firms. We utilize this within observa-
tion variation to examine whether and to what extent characteristics of the firm-peer relation effect
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the pay-for-performance sensitivity βρ. A given characteristic of the firm-peer relation is identified
as aspirational if it results in a higher estimated value of βρ relative to the estimated value in the
absence of that characteristic.
We consider three observable characteristics of the relation between the firm and each of its
peers individually. First, we use the directional nature of the firm-peer relation to distinguish
between one-way and two-way relationships. The relation is two-way if both firms list the other
as a peer and one-way if the peer firm does not reciprocate the relation by also listing the focal
firm as its peer. We expect that one-way relationships are indicative of an aspirational peer firm. If
the relationship is two-way, then both firms find it beneficial to benchmark performance relative to
each other, which is consistent with a competitive peer relation guided by traditional RPE models.
Second, we examine the size (market value of equity) of the peer firm relative to the focal
firm. Albuquerque (2009) highlights the importance of size in identifying competitive peer firm
groups that are subjected to common shocks. Therefore, firms that are similar in size to its peer are
consistent with a competitive relation, while large peer firms may be consistent with an aspirational
relation. However, an explicit prediction is difficult because even large firms may aspire to emulate
a small firm’s strategy (e.g., an oil company may look to a new eco-friendly start-up company for
a strategy to reduce its environmental impact in order to improve public perception).
Finally, we consider whether the peer firm is in a different industry that the focal firm. Prior
studies use industry to identify competitive peer groups for implicit tests of RPE.10 On average,
44.1% of a focal firm’s peers are in a different two-digit SIC classification (see Table 1). These
peer firms are expected to be more reflective of an aspirational relationship.
10Representative RPE studies based on industry peer groups include Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy
(1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999a,b), Garvey and Milbourn (2006), Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006), and Albuquerque (2009,
2014).
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We utilize a mixed data sampling regression model (e.g., Ghysels et al. 2005; Ball 2017),
which are specifically designed to exploit within observation data variation (e.g., within peer port-
folio variation in the observed firm-peer relation), to measure and test the effect of each firm-peer
characteristic on the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity βρ. We estimate the following:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ ·Retj,t +
Nj,t∑
k=1
[
βρ(k) · perf corrj,t,kNj,t
]
+ βΠ ·Peer Retj,t
+ βA
+
Π · (Peer Retj,t ·A+j,t) + Controlsj,t + εj,t, (4)
subject to: βρ(k) = b0ρ + b
1-way
ρ · i 1-wayj,t,k + b largerρ · i largerj,t,k + bdiff-indρ · i diff-indj,t,k . (5)
This specification is similar to the model specified in (3) with one important difference. The perfor-
mance correlations between the focal firm and each peer firm, denoted by perf corrj,t,k, are included
as separate explanatory variables instead of including a single performance correlation Perf Corrj,t
with respect to the aggregated peer portfolio.11 As a result, the regression in (4) permits the esti-
mation of a separate pay-for-performance coefficient, denoted by βρ(k), for each peer k.
While ideal for identifying the influence of aspirational peer firms, estimating separate coeffi-
cients is not feasible because the number of firm-year-peer observations greatly exceeds the number
of observations of firm-year CEO compensation. Therefore, we avoid this issue of parameter pro-
liferation by specifying βρ(k) in (5) as a function of the three observable firm-peer characteristics
we examine and four estimated parameters. The first firm-peer characteristic i 1-wayj,t,k is an indicator
variable equal to one if the relationship between firm j and its peer k is one-way (i.e., k does not
consider j to be its peer) and equal to zero otherwise. The second characteristic i largerj,t,k is an indi-
11The variable perf corrj,t,k is defined as the performance correlation between firm j and its peer firm k in fiscal
year t. We scale by the total number of j’s peer firms in t (Nj,t) to increase comparability across firm-year observations.
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cator variable equal to one if the market value of firm j’s peer k is larger than the market value of
firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t and equal to zero otherwise. The last characteristic i diff-indj,t,k is
an indicator variable equal to one if firm j is in a different two-digit SIC industry as its peer k at
the beginning of the fiscal year and equal to zero otherwise.
The four estimated parameters in (5), denoted by a lowercase b, are data-driven measures of
how each of the firm-peer characteristics incrementally changes the CEO pay-performance corre-
lation sensitivity βρ(k). If having a one-way peer, a larger peer, or a peer in a different industry is
associated with aspirational peers, then the estimated parameters b1-wayρ , b
larger
ρ and b
diff-ind
ρ , respec-
tively, are expected to be positive and significant. The fourth estimated parameter b0ρ represents
the baseline CEO pay-performance correlation sensitivity from which the other three parameters
measure the incremental change in the association.
Table 5 reports parameter values estimated from four versions of the mixed data sampling re-
gression in (4) subject to (5). Columns one through three individually add each of the characteristic
indicator variables. For example, column one reports parameter estimates when βρ(k) is specified
as a linear function of the one-way indicator variable i 1-wayj,t,k only. In this version, the parameter b
0
ρ
represents the baseline CEO pay-performance correlation sensitivity between the firm and a spe-
cific peer when the relationship is two-way, and b1-wayρ measures the incremental difference when it
is one-way. The estimate value of b1-wayρ is 0.803 (t-statistic of 5.74), which is different from zero
at a 1% level of statistical significance. In contrast, the baseline parameter b0ρ is 0.059 (t-statistic
of 0.61), which is not statistically different from zero. This indicates that one-way relationships
have a pay-for-performance correlation sensitivity that is approximately fourteen times greater than
two-way relationships, which is economically significant. It is provides evidence that a one-way
firm-peer relationship is a hallmark indicator that the relation is aspirational.
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Parameter estimates when βρ(k) is specified as a linear function of the larger peer firm indicator
variable i largerj,t,k are presented in column two. The estimated baseline parameter b
0
ρ is 0.435 (t-statistic
of 5.05), which is different from zero at a 1% level of statistical significance. In contrast to the
one-way characteristic, the estimated parameter measuring the incremental effect of a larger peer
firm characteristic b largerρ is only 0.161 (t-statistic of 1.28), which is not statistically significant.
Thus, it appears that firm size does not play an important role in distinguishing aspirational peers
from other peer groups.
Column three reports parameter estimates when βρ(k) is specified as a linear function of the
different industry indicator variable i diff-indj,t,k . Similar to the results reported in column one, the
estimated parameter bdiff-indρ is 0.423 (t-statistic of 3.89), which is different from zero at a 1% level
of statistical significance, and the estimated baseline parameter b0ρ is 0.359 (t-statistic of 4.90).
This indicates that peer firms in different industries are associated with a pay-for-performance
correlation sensitivity that is approximately twice the sensitivity for peers in the same industry as
the focal firm. In addition, it provides evidence that a peer firm from a different industry is an key
characteristic that identifies an aspirational relationship.
Finally, column four presents parameter estimates from the full model of βρ(k) in (5) by includ-
ing all three characteristics. In this specification, the estimated value for bdiff-indρ is 0.319 (t-statistic
of 2.95), which is still different from zero at a 1% level of statistical significance. The estimated
value of b1-wayρ is 0.711 (t-statistic of 4.97), which is only marginally lower than the estimate in
column one. Finally, the larger peer firm parameter b largerρ has a small positive magnitude and is
not statistically different from zero, which is consistent with the results in column two. Overall,
the results from this preliminary analysis of characteristics driving an aspirational firm-peer rela-
tionship point to a one-way relationship as the dominant driver of βρ(k), while peer firms from a
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different industry also contribute.
6. Conclusions
The predictions tested and results reported in this study of aspirational peer firms represent key
departures from those of prior RPE studies, which focus exclusively on tests with respect to firms’
competitive peer groups. This difference is a direct result of the strong, yet standard, restrictions
imposed on the production technology and the information dynamics in that literature, which are
relaxed in the model we use to motivate our analysis: (1) that the sensitivities to positive versus
negative shocks are identical, (2) that the variance-covariance of own and peer performance is
exogenous, and (3) that either the manager receives no feedback about peer performance over the
contracting period, or such feedback is inconsequential to the optimal contract.
The results of our analysis provide new evidence that firms use aspirational peer groups to
evaluate and compensate CEOs. It suggests that the mechanism for using this type of benchmark
to evaluate performance is to anchor compensation in part to the degree to which the firm’s per-
formance is correlated with the performance of its aspirational peer. In addition, the aggregate
performance of the aspirational peer, which is the main focus of prior competitive RPE studies,
plays only a secondary role that is predicated on asymmetric exposure to good and bad news. It is
not simply based the sign of the equilibrium covariance as per the standard RPE prediction.
We also provide evidence consistent with the idea that firms choose aspirational peers. Specif-
ically, we document that non-mutual firm-peer relationships and peers in a different industry are
characteristics that are associated with the theoretical implications of being an aspirational peer.
This is important, because the theoretical construct that defines aspirational peers in the model
motivating our analyses represents an out-of-equilibrium construct that is neither observable nor
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directly measurable.
Our focus on the role of performance correlation with respect to aspirational peer firms com-
plements the extensive literature on competitive peer firm RPE by identifying and testing a new
dimension that provides a more complete picture of how firms evaluate and compensate executives.
The method we employ and the corresponding evidence we present provides a platform to examine
other characteristics of aspirational peer firms as well as additional economic implications of using
them in RPE.
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Appendix: Variable descriptions and measurement
A.1. CEO compensation variable:
Compj,t Change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO between
fiscal years t and t–1, where total annual compensation in a given fiscal year is equal to
the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options
granted, long-term incentive payouts and all other compensation (ExecuComp TDC1).
A.2. Firm-year-peer variables
ret 3-dayj,t,τ Natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s stock return for a three-day subperiod τ within fiscal
year t.
peer ret 3-dayj,t,k,τ Natural logarithm of one plus the stock return for firm j’s peer k for a three-day subperiod τ
within fiscal year t.
perf corrj,t,k Correlation coefficient between firm j’s three-day stock returns (ret
3-day
j,t,τ ) and the three-day
stock return for firm j’s peer k (peer ret 3-dayj,t,k,τ ), which is estimated using the 84 three-day
return windows within j’s fiscal year t (i.e., approximately 84× 3 = 252 trading days total
within a fiscal year).
i 1-wayj,t,k An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the relationship between firm j and its peer k is
(not) one-way (i.e., k does not also consider j as its peer).
i largerj,t,k An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the market value of firm j’s peer k is (not) larger
than the market value of equity of firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t.
i diff-indj,t,k An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if firm j peer k during fiscal year t.
peer retj,t,k Natural logarithm of one plus the annual stock return for firm i’s peer j measured during i’s
fiscal year t, such that
∑84
τ=1 peer ret
3-day
j,t,k,τ = peer retj,t,k.
ret+j,t,τ Indicator variable equal to one if ret
3-day
j,t,τ ≥ 0 and equal to zero otherwise.
peer ret+j,t, k,τ Indicator variable equal to one if peer ret
3-day
j,t,k,τ ≥ 0 and equal to zero otherwise.
γ+j,t,k Conditional probability of a positive stock return for firm j’s peer k during a three-day
subperiod τ , within fiscal year t given that firm j also has a positive return during τ . For
a given firm j, peer firm k and fiscal year t, γ+j,t,k is estimated using 252 three-day return
windows during the three most recent fiscal years prior to t (i.e., t–1, t–2 and t–3) as
follows:
γ+j,t,k = Pr(peer ret
+
j,t, k,τ = 1 | ret+j,t,τ = 1) =
3∑
s=1
84∑
τ=1
[peer ret+j,t–s, k,τ × ret+j,t–s,τ ]
3∑
s=1
84∑
τ=1
ret+j,t–s,τ
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A.2. Firm-year-peer variables (continued)
γ−j,t,k Conditional probability of a non-positive stock return for firm j’s peer k during a three-day
subperiod τ , within fiscal year t given that firm j also has a non-positive return during τ .
For a given firm j, peer firm k and fiscal year t, γ−j,t,k is estimated using 252 three-day
return windows during the three most recent fiscal years prior to t (i.e., t–1, t–2 and t–3) as
follows:
γ−j,t,k = Pr [peer ret
+
j,t, k,τ = 0 | ret+j,t,τ = 0] =
3∑
s=1
84∑
τ=1
[ (1−peer ret+j,t–s, k,τ )× (1−ret+j,t–s,τ ) ]
3∑
s=1
84∑
τ=1
(1−ret+j,t–s,τ )
A.3. Firm-year performance variables
Retj,t Natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t, such that∑84
τ=1 ret
3-day
j,t,τ = Retj,t.
Perf Corrj,t Average performance correlations between firm j and its peer firms k during fiscal year t,
which is equal to
∑Nj,t
k=1 perf corrj,t,k/Nj,t, where Nj,t is the number of firm with non-missing
performance measures that firm j considers to be a peer in fiscal year t.
Peer Retj,t Average of aggregate peer performances for all of firm j’s peer firms k during fiscal year t,
which is equal to
∑Nj,t
k=1 peer retj,t,k/Nj,t, where Nj,t is the number of firms with non-missing
performance measures that firm j considers to be a peer in fiscal year t.
Γ+j,t (Γ
−
j,t) Average across all of firm j’s peer firms k during fiscal year t of conditional probability of
a positive (non-positive) stock return for j’s peer k during a three-day subperiod τ within
fiscal year t given that firm j also has a positive (non-positive) return during τ , which is
equal to
∑Nj,t
τ=1 γ
+
j,t,k/Nj,t (
∑Nj,t
τ=1 γ
−
j,t,k/Nj,t), where Nj,t is the number of firms with non-
missing performance measures that firm j considers to be a peer in fiscal year t.
A+j,t Positive asymmetric sensitivity to peer performance represented by an indicator variable
equal to one if the average conditional probability of positive returns for both firm j and its
peer firms Γ+j,t is greater than the average conditional probability of non-positive returns for
both firm j and its peer firms Γ−j,t and equal to zero otherwise.
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A.4. Firm-year control variables
ISVj,t Idiosyncratic return volatility for firm j in fiscal year t, which is equal to the standard
deviation of residuals from a time-series regression of firm j’s monthly returns on two-digit
SIC industry returns estimated using the most recent 36 (minimum of 18 required) monthly
returns immediately prior to the beginning of fiscal year t. Industry returns are computed
as the equal-weighted portfolio return based on firms in the same two-digit SIC, excluding
the monthly return of firm j.
Sizej,t Change in the size of firm j, between the beginning of fiscal years t and t–1, where firm
size is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of firm j’s total assets.
MTBj,t Change in the market-to-book ratio of firm j, between the beginning of fiscal years t
and t–1, where the market-to-book ratio is computed as firm j’s market value of total assets
divided by the book value of total assets. Market value of assets is equal to the book value
of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.
Nj,t Number of firms with non-missing firm-performance variables that firm j considers to be a
peer in fiscal year t.
%Peers1-wayj,t Fraction of firm j’s peer firm relationships during fiscal year t that are one-way (i.e., peer
firm does not consider j as a peer), which is computed by
∑Nj,t
k=1 i
1-way
j,t,k /Nj,t.
%Peerslargerj,t Fraction of firm j’s peer firms that have a larger market value of equity than j at the begin-
ning of fiscal year t, which is computed by
∑Nj,t
k=1 i
larger
j,t,k /Nj,t.
%Peersdiff-indj,t Fraction of firm j’s peer firms that are in a different two-digit SIC industry during fiscal
year t, which is computed by
∑Nj,t
k=1 i
diff-ind
j,t,k /Nj,t.
Ownj,t CEO’s percentage ownership of firm j, and is equal to the number of shares (excluding
options) owned divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the beginning of
fiscal year t.
Chairj,t Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the title of firm j’s CEO in fiscal year t indicates
(does not indicate) that the CEO is also the board chair.
Tenurej,t The natural logarithm of the tenure of firm j’s CEO at the end of fiscal year t, where tenure
is defined as the number of days between the last day of fiscal year t and the day when the
CEO assumed the position.
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Table 1
Sample summary statistics
Percentile
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th
Compj,t 0.069 0.455 −0.110 0.066 0.269
Retj,t 0.077 0.383 −0.084 0.124 0.294
Perf Corrj,t 0.496 0.155 0.380 0.495 0.613
Peer Retj,t 0.065 0.298 −0.044 0.128 0.251
ISVj,t 0.086 0.042 0.055 0.076 0.107
Sizej,t 0.076 0.163 −0.006 0.054 0.133
MTBj,t 0.003 0.507 −0.139 0.015 0.177
Nj,t 17.226 8.706 12.000 16.000 20.000
%Peers1-wayj,t 0.624 0.232 0.462 0.650 0.813
%Peerslargerj,t 0.558 0.230 0.391 0.556 0.727
%Peersdiff-indj,t 0.441 0.346 0.100 0.412 0.762
Ownj,t 0.015 0.039 0.001 0.003 0.010
Tenurej,t 7.873 0.673 7.367 7.870 8.350
Chairj,t 0.573
A+j,t 0.646
This table presents summary statistics for all variables based on a sample of 7,039 firm-year observations
with a fiscal year ending between 2007 and 2014. Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total
annual compensation for firm j’s CEO between fiscal years t and t–1. Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance
in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t.
Perf Corrj,t is the equal-weighted average of the correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock
returns and three-day stock returns of each of j’s peer firms estimated from the 84 three-day return windows
within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of the aggregate performances of firm j’s
peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural logarithm
of one plus the annual stock return in fiscal year t. Other variables include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t;
firm size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; number of peer firms, Nj,t; percentage of peer firms with a
1-way relationship, %Peers1-wayj,t ; percentage of larger peer firms, %Peers
larger
j,t ; percentage of peer firms in a
different industry, %Peersdiff-indj,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t; an indicator for when the CEO is also the board
chair, Chairj,t; and CEO tenure, Tenurej,t. A+j,t measures the asymmetric sensitivity to peer performance,
which is represented as an indicator variable equal to one if the average conditional probability of positive
returns for both firm j and its peer firms is greater than or equal to the conditional probability of non-positive
returns for both firm j and its peer firms and equal to zero otherwise. The appendix provides the definitions
and measurements for all variables.
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Table 2
Sample correlation matrix
Variable Compj,t Retj,t Perf Corrj,t Peer Retj,t ISVj,t Sizej,t MTBj,t %Peers
1-way
j,t %Peers
larger
j,t %Peers
diff-ind
j,t
Compj,t 0.172
† 0.063† 0.105† 0.072† −0.052† 0.120† 0.011 0.033† −0.012
Retj,t 0.196
† −0.084† 0.721† 0.061† −0.150† −0.047† −0.059† 0.048† −0.008
Perf Corrj,t 0.048† −0.094† −0.180† −0.231† −0.035† −0.005 −0.323† −0.117† −0.245†
Peer Retj,t 0.093† 0.673† −0.181† 0.077† −0.153† −0.033† −0.089† 0.006 −0.001
ISVj,t 0.081† 0.062† −0.233† 0.066† −0.055† 0.006 0.246† 0.301† 0.054†
Sizej,t −0.045† −0.135† −0.025† −0.157† −0.061† −0.146† 0.054† −0.153† −0.017
MTBj,t 0.134† −0.028† −0.019 −0.056† 0.011 −0.102† −0.016 −0.087† 0.019
%Peers1-wayj,t 0.023 −0.035† −0.313† −0.054† 0.274† 0.032† −0.007 0.209† 0.295†
%Peerslargerj,t 0.037
† 0.065† −0.112† 0.012 0.297† −0.194† −0.093† 0.205† −0.015
%Peersdiff-indj,t −0.014 0.001 −0.260† 0.010 0.080† −0.019 0.041† 0.300† −0.010
This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal for all continuous variables based on a sample of 7,039 firm-year
observations with a fiscal year ending between 2007 and 2014. Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO
between fiscal years t and t–1. Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock
return in fiscal year t. Perf Corrj,t is the equal-weighted average of the correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock returns and three-day stock returns
of each of j’s peer firms estimated from the 84 three-day return windows within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of the aggregate
performances of firm j’s peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the annual stock
return in fiscal year t. Other variables include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; percentage of peer firms with a 1-way
relationship, %Peers1-wayj,t ; percentage of larger peer firms, %Peers
larger
j,t ; and percentage of peer firms in a different industry, %Peers
diff-ind
j,t . The appendix provides
the definitions and measurements for all variables. The superscript † indicates that the correlation coefficient is different from zero with a 5% level of statistical
significance.
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Table 3
Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance correlation
Variable Pred. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retj,t + 0.239
∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(10.14) (9.53) (10.40) (9.47)
Perf Corrj,t + 0.324∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(7.82) (8.65)
Peer Retj,t −0.061∗∗ −0.018 −0.022 0.043
(−2.08) (−0.59) (−0.60) (1.13)
ISVj,t 0.311∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(2.25) (4.88)
Sizej,t −0.002 0.001
(−0.05) (0.02)
MTBj,t 0.095∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(6.50) (6.11)
Nj,t 0.001 0.001
(1.02) (0.88)
%Peers1-wayj,t 0.026 0.101
∗∗∗
(1.18) (4.26)
%Peerslargerj,t 0.045
∗∗ 0.032
(2.07) (1.48)
%Peersdiff-indj,t −0.028 −0.020
(−1.63) (−1.16)
Ownj,t −0.020 0.081
(−0.13) (0.55)
Chairj,t −0.010 −0.018∗∗
(−1.08) (−2.00)
Tenurej,t −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(−2.71) (−2.27)
Industry fixed-effects: N N Y Y
Year fixed-effects: N N Y Y
Adj. R2 0.030 0.035 0.065 0.074
This table presents coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression estimated for a sample of 7,039 firm-year observa-
tions with a fiscal year ending between 2007 and 2014:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ · Retj,t + βρ · Perf Corrj,t + βΠ · Peer Retj,t + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
The dependent variable Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO between fiscal years t and t–1.
Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t.
Perf Corrj,t is the equal-weighted average of the correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock returns and three-day stock returns of
each of j’s peer firms estimated from the 84 three-day return windows within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of the
aggregate performances of firm j’s peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural logarithm
of one plus the annual stock return in fiscal year t. Additional variables, represented by Controlsj,t, include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm
size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; number of peer firm, Nj,t; percentage of peer firms with a 1-way relationship, %Peers
1-way
j,t ; percentage
of larger peer firms, %Peerslargerj,t ; percentage of peer firms in a different industry, %Peers
diff-ind
j,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t; an indicator for when the
CEO is also the board chair, Chairj,t; CEO tenure, Tenurej,t; two-digit SIC industry fixed-effect parameters (not reported); and year fixed-effect
parameters (not reported). The appendix provides the definitions and measurements for all variables. One, two, and three stars indicate that the
estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively, based on standard errors clustered by
firm.
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Table 4
Regressions estimating the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate peer performance
Sub-sample Analysis
Full Sample
Pred. Interaction A+j,t = 1 A
+
j,t = 0 Difference
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retj,t + 0.213
∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.037
(9.16) (8.78) (2.55) (0.52)
Perf Corrj,t + 0.523∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ −0.266
(9.16) (8.32) (3.49) (−1.22)
Peer Retj,t −0.201∗∗ 0.081∗ −0.147∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(−2.40) (1.89) (−2.07) (2.68)
Peer Retj,t · A+j,t + 0.281∗∗∗
(3.28)
A+j,t −0.049∗∗
(−2.45)
Controlsj,t included: Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Year fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.076 0.076 0.055
Column (1) of this table reports coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression estimated
for a sample of 7,039 firm-year observations between 2007 and 2014:
Compj,t = β0 + β
+
0 · A+j,t + βΩ ·Retj,t + βρ ·Perf Corrj,t + βΠ ·Peer Retj,t + βA
+
Π · (Peer Retj,t ·A+j,t) + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
The dependent variable Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO
between fiscal years t and t–1. Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural
logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t. Perf Corrj,t is the equal-weighted average of the
correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock returns and three-day stock returns of each of j’s peer firms
estimated from the 84 three-day return windows within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of
the aggregate performances of firm j’s peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm
is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the annual stock return in fiscal year t. A+j,t measures the asymmetric
sensitivity to peer performance, which is represented as an indicator variable equal to one if the average conditional
probability of positive returns for both firm j and its peer firms is greater than or equal to the conditional probability
of non-positive returns for both firm j and its peer firms and equal to zero otherwise. Additional control variables,
represented by Controlsj,t, are not reported, but include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm size, Sizej,t; market-to-book
ratio, MTBj,t; number of peer firm, Nj,t; percentage of peer firms with a 1-way relationship, %Peers
1-way
j,t ; percentage of
larger peer firms, %Peerslargerj,t ; percentage of peer firms in a different industry, %Peers
diff-ind
j,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t;
an indicator for when the CEO is also the board chair, Chairj,t; CEO tenure, Tenurej,t; two-digit SIC industry fixed-
effect parameters; and year fixed-effect parameters. The appendix provides the definitions and measurements for all
variables. Columns (2) and (3) report coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression
estimated for sub-samples with a positive asymmetry (A+j,t = 1) and a negative asymmetry (A
+
j,t = 0), respectively:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ · Retj,t + βρ · Perf Corrj,t + βΠ · Peer Retj,t + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
Column (4) reports the difference in coefficient values reported in columns (2) and (3). One, two, and three stars
indicate that the estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance,
respectively, based on standard errors clustered by firm.
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Table 5
Mixed data sampling regressions estimating the effect of firm-peer relationship characteristics on
the CEO pay-for-performance correlation sensitivity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
b0ρ 0.059 0.435
∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ −0.042
(0.61) (5.05) (4.90) (−0.37)
b1-wayρ 0.803
∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(5.74) (4.97)
b largerρ 0.161 0.055
(1.28) (0.43)
bdiff-indρ 0.423
∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(3.89) (2.95)
Controlsj,t included: Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Year fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.079 0.076 0.077 0.080
This table presents parameter values (t-statistics in parentheses) describing the sensitivity of CEO compensation to
performance correlation βρ(k), which are estimated from the following regression model using for a sample of 7,039
firm-year observations with a fiscal year ending between 2007 and 2014:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ ·Retj,t +
Nj,t∑
k=1
[
βρ(k) · perf corrj,t,kNj,t
]
+ βΠ ·Peer Retj,t + βA+Π · (Peer Retj,t ·A+j,t) + Controlsj,t + εj,t,
subject to: βρ(k) = b0ρ + b
1-way
ρ · i 1-wayj,t,k + b largerρ · i largerj,t,k + bdiff-indρ · i diff-indj,t,k .
The dependent variable Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO
between fiscal years t and t–1. Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural
logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t. perf corrj,t,k is the correlation coefficient between
firm j’s three-day stock returns and the three-day stock return of firm j’s peer k estimated from the 84 three-day
return windows within j’s fiscal year t. In addition, perf corrj,t,k is scaled by the total number of firm j’s peer firms
in fiscal year t in order to facilitate comparison across firm-year observations. i largerj,t,k is an indicator variable equal to
one if the market value of firm j’s peer k is larger than the market value of firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t and
equal to zero otherwise. i 1-wayj,t,k is an indicator variable equal to one if the relationship between firm j and its peer k
is one-way (i.e., k does not also consider j as its peer) and equal to zero otherwise. i diff-indj,t,k is an indicator variable
equal to one if firm j is in the same two-digit SIC industry as its peer k at the beginning of the fiscal year and equal
to zero otherwise. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of the aggregate performances of firm j’s peer firms in
fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the annual
stock return in fiscal year t. Additional control variables, represented by Controlsj,t, are not reported, but include:
idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; number of peer firm, Nj,t; percentage of
peer firms with a 1-way relationship, %Peers1-wayj,t ; percentage of larger peer firms, %Peers
larger
j,t ; percentage of peer
firms in a different industry, %Peersdiff-indj,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t; an indicator for when the CEO is also the board
chair, Chairj,t; CEO tenure, Tenurej,t; two-digit SIC industry fixed-effect parameters; and year fixed-effect parameters.
The appendix provides the definitions and measurements for all variables. One, two, and three stars indicate that the
estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively, based
on standard errors clustered by firm.
38
Focal
Firm
ω+
ω+
Pr
(ω
+ )
=
p τ
Aspirational
Peer Firm
pi+
pi+
Pr (pi +
) =
q
τ
Pr (pi+ | ω+) = γ+τ = a ·γτ
Pr (pi− | ω−) = γ−τ = γτ
Figure 1. Sub-period structure of the two-firm, two-agent model with an aspirational peer firm.
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Table OA.1.
Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance correlation (value-weighted)
Variable Pred. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retj,t + 0.233
∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(9.99) (9.40) (10.49) (9.63)
Perf Corrj,t + 0.336∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(8.29) (9.10)
Peer Retj,t −0.057∗ −0.009 −0.023 0.039
(−1.79) (−0.27) (−0.58) (0.98)
ISVj,t 0.310∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(2.24) (4.88)
Sizej,t −0.002 −0.001
(−0.04) (−0.03)
MTBj,t 0.095∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(6.50) (6.04)
Nj,t 0.001 0.001
(1.02) (1.19)
%Peers1-wayj,t 0.026 0.092
∗∗∗
(1.19) (3.96)
%Peerslargerj,t 0.045
∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(2.08) (2.16)
%Peersdiff-indj,t −0.028 −0.012
(−1.62) (−0.71)
Ownj,t −0.020 0.067
(−0.13) (0.45)
Chairj,t −0.010 −0.018∗∗
(−1.09) (−2.00)
Tenurej,t −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗
(−2.71) (−2.33)
Industry fixed-effects: N N Y Y
Year fixed-effects: N N Y Y
Adj. R2 0.030 0.036 0.065 0.075
This table presents coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression estimated for a sample of 7,039 firm-year observa-
tions with a fiscal year ending between 2007 and 2014:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ · Retj,t + βρ · Perf Corrj,t + βΠ · Peer Retj,t + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
The dependent variable Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO between fiscal years t and t–1.
Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal year t.
Perf Corrj,t is the equal-weighted average of the correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock returns and three-day stock returns of
each of j’s peer firms estimated from the 84 three-day return windows within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the equal-weighted average of the
aggregate performances of firm j’s peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural logarithm of
one plus the annual stock return in fiscal year t. Additional control variables, represented by Controlsj,t, include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm
size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; number of peer firm, Nj,t; percentage of peer firms with a 1-way relationship, %Peers
1-way
j,t ; percentage
of larger peer firms, %Peerslargerj,t ; percentage of peer firms in a different industry, %Peers
diff-ind
j,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t; an indicator for when the
CEO is also the board chair, Chairj,t; CEO tenure, Tenurej,t; two-digit SIC industry fixed-effect parameters (not reported); and year fixed-effect
parameters (not reported). The appendix provides the definitions and measurements for all variables. One, two, and three stars indicate that the
estimated coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively, based on standard errors clustered by
firm.
Table OA.2.
Regressions estimating the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate peer performance
(value-weighted)
Sub-sample Analysis
Full Sample
Pred. Interaction A+j,t = 1 A
+
j,t = 0 Difference
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Retj,t + 0.217
∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.011
(9.55) (9.12) (2.78) (0.15)
Perf Corrj,t + 0.518∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ −0.182
(9.61) (8.67) (3.47) (−0.93)
Peer Retj,t −0.291∗∗∗ 0.077∗ −0.187∗∗ 0.264∗∗
(−2.96) (1.91) (−2.13) (2.38)
Peer Retj,t · A+j,t + 0.365∗∗∗
(3.72)
A+j,t −0.053∗∗∗
(−2.61)
Controlsj,t included: Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Year fixed-effects: Y Y Y Y
Adj. R2 0.077 0.077 0.056
Column (1) of this table reports coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression estimated for a sample of 7,039 firm-year
observations between 2007 and 2014:
Compj,t = β0 + β
+
0 · A+j,t + βΩ ·Retj,t + βρ ·Perf Corrj,t + βΠ ·Peer Retj,t + βA
+
Π · (Peer Retj,t ·A+j,t ) + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
The dependent variable Compj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total annual compensation for firm j’s CEO between fiscal years t and t–1.
Retj,t is firm j’s aggregate performance in fiscal year t, which is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus firm j’s annual stock return in fiscal
year t. Perf Corrj,t is the value-weighted average of the correlation coefficients between firm j’s three-day stock returns and three-day stock
returns of each of j’s peer firms estimated from the 84 three-day return windows within j’s fiscal year t. Peer Retj,t is the value-weighted average
of the aggregate performances of firm j’s peer firms in fiscal year t, where aggregate performance for a given peer firm is equal to the natural
logarithm of one plus the annual stock return in fiscal year t. A+j,t measures the asymmetric sensitivity to peer performance, which is represented as
an indicator variable equal to one if the average conditional probability of positive returns for both firm j and its peer firms is greater than or equal
to the conditional probability of non-positive returns for both firm j and its peer firms and equal to zero otherwise. Additional control variables,
represented byControlsj,t, are not reported, but include: idiosyncratic volatility, ISVj,t; firm size, Sizej,t; market-to-book ratio, MTBj,t; number of
peer firm, Nj,t; percentage of peer firms with a 1-way relationship, %Peers
1-way
j,t ; percentage of larger peer firms, %Peers
larger
j,t ; percentage of peer
firms in a different industry, %Peersdiff-indj,t ; CEO ownership, Ownj,t; an indicator for when the CEO is also the board chair, Chairj,t; CEO tenure,
Tenurej,t; two-digit SIC industry fixed-effect parameters; and year fixed-effect parameters. The appendix provides the definitions and measurements
for all variables. Columns (2) and (3) report coefficient values (t-statistics in parentheses) from the following regression estimated for sub-samples
with a positive asymmetry (A+j,t = 1) and a negative asymmetry (A
+
j,t = 0), respectively:
Compj,t = β0 + βΩ · Retj,t + βρ · Perf Corrj,t + βΠ · Peer Retj,t + Controlsj,t + εj,t.
Column (4) reports the difference in coefficient values reported in columns (2) and (3). One, two, and three stars indicate that the estimated
coefficient is different from zero at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively, based on standard errors clustered by firm.
